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Information and molecular biology
Historically, the term "information" entered molecular biology as part of a putative theory of biological specificity. By around 1930, it had become clear that molecular interactions in living organisms are highly specific in the sense that particular molecules interact with exactly one, or at most a few, reagents. Enzymes act on specific substrates. Living organisms produce antibodies that are highly specific, not only to naturally occurring antigens, but also to artificial antigens (Landsteiner 1936) . Even the action of genes was sometimes described using "specificity": genes specified precise phenotypes to different degrees of accuracy called their "specificity" (Timof6eff-Ressovsky and Timof6eff-Ressovsky 1926). In genetics, the ultimate exemplar of specificity became the gene-enzyme relationship (Beadle and Tatum 1941): "one gene-one enzyme" was perhaps the most important organizing hypothesis of early molecular biology.
By the end of the 1930s, a highly successful theory of specificity (and one that remains central to molecular biology) emerged. Due primarily to Linus Pauling (e.g., Pauling 1940), although with many antecedents, this theory claimed that the behavior of a macromolecule is determined by its conformation, and that what mediates biological interactions is a precise lock-and-key fit between the shapes of molecules. In the 1940s, when no three-dimensional structure of a biological macromolecule had yet been determined, the conformational theory of specificity was speculative. The demonstration of its approximate truth for a wide variety of interactions, which came in the late 1950s and 1960s, was one of molecular biology's most significant triumphs. Just as "one geneone enzyme" was the archetypal slogan of early molecular biology, "structure determines function" came to be the dominating principle of the field during its triumphant 1960s.
Meanwhile, back in 1944, in What Is Life?, Erwin Schrodinger had introduced a conceptual scheme that raised the possibility of a startlingly different source of specificity. Schrodinger asked how so tiny an object as the nucleus of a fertilized cell could contain all of the specifications (i.e., instructions) necessary for normal development of an adult organism. He stated that there existed in the nucleus some structure whose organization was interpreted as "an elaborate code-script," which he compared to the Morse code (Schr6dinger 1944). Although he was willing to countenance codes in more than one dimension, even a linear code based on a 5-letter alphabet and word of up to 25 letters could generate more than 1017 patterns. Thus the arrangement of the units rather than their physical shape became the source of specificity in Schrodinger's model. In the postwar era, when many scientists who were initially trained in physics turned their attention to biology for the first time, What Is Life? was influential in setting the agenda of a new biology (Sarkar 1991 1946a, b) . "Transformation," "induction," and "transduction" were some of the new terms introduced to describe these phenomena (Ephrussi et al. 1953) . In an attempt to navigate through this terminological morass, Ephrussi et al. (1953) suggested that the term "interbacterial information" replace them all. This was the first modern use of "information" in genetics. , they went on to use "information" explicitly, and defined it implicitly as what the "code" carried: "The phosphate-sugar backbone in our model is completely regular but any sequence of the pairs of bases can fit into the structure. It follows that in a long molecule many different permutations are possible, and it therefore seems likely that the precise sequence of bases is the code which carries the genetic information." "Information" was finally defined explicitly by Crick in 1958, who identified it with the specification of a protein sequence. Crick's (1958) concern was the synthesis of proteins. There were three separate factors involved, he argued: "the flow of energy, the flow of matter, and the flow of information" (Crick 1958). The former two exhausted the physics and chemistry of the situation, whereas information was peculiar to biological systems. Crick (1958, p. 144) defined "information" with more care than ever before in this context: "By information I mean the specification of the amino acid sequence of the protein." He took it for granted that the genetic information was encoded in a DNA sequence. The physics and chemistry of folding of a protein, Crick hypothesized, were purely a result of its amino acid sequence. This is the well-known "sequence hypothesis" (which remains unproved because of the continued insolvability of the protein folding problem were all shown to be incorrect.
The most interesting and, in some ways, influential of the theoretical attempts to establish the nature of the genetic code was the "commafree" coding scheme of Crick et al. (1957) , who introduced relatively sophisticated ideas about information storage and transmission. Their only experimental criterion for judging success was the "magic number," 20, of amino acid residues that occurred naturally in proteins and, therefore, must be coded for by DNA. They rejected overlapping codes on experimental grounds and argued that it was natural to restrict attention to triplet codes because doublet ones would allow only 16 coding units, whereas triplet ones, allowing 64, were clearly sufficient.
From their point of view, there were two problems to be solved. But why settle for synchronization alone? In 1958, Max Delbriick pointed out that genetic information ultimately resides in double-stranded DNA rather than in only one strand (Golomb et al. 1958 ). Consequently, synchronization must simultaneously hold for both strands. The "dictionary,"' Delbriick insisted, would be better off if this additional constraint on synchronization were also satisfied. This constraint was a natural extension of comma-freedom for a single strand and was called "transposability." Once it is imposed, triplet codes can no longer code for the 20 amino acid residue types known to occur in proteins. Triplet codes can now code for at most 16 residue types because the "converse" of each meaningful triplet, as determined by base pairing, must, when read from right to left, also belong to the set of coding triplets. This rules out many of the meaningful triplets of the original commafree codes. Attention, therefore, shifted to quadruplet codes, and in 1962 Samuel Golomb reported from computer searches that there can be at least 57 quadruplet codons.
Pursuing coding as a mathematical idea, Golomb (1962) introduced another scheme, that of "biorthogonal codes," based on the mathematical theory of Hadamard matrices, which had six nucleotides code for each amino acid residue. Its biological motivation remains mysterious. Golomb provided no reason for its introduction but was apparently sufficiently convinced of the biological potential of all of these new formal schemes to observe: "It will be interesting to see how much of the final solution [of the coding problem] will be proposed by the mathematicians before the experimentalists find it, and how much the experimenters will be ahead of the mathematicians" (Golomb 1962 What had gone wrong with the comma-free code is that none of the elegant properties that were imposed on the code from considerations about information are revered in the living organism. The attempts to decipher the code in the 1950s using these ideas were an unmitigated failure. Even the ideas that the code was fully synchronized and fully sequential eventually came to be modified through the discovery of frameshift mutations and noncoding regions of the genome. The only idea to be validated, besides the uniformity of codon length, was Schr6dinger's original one-merely that of the existence of a genetic code. But even the simplest form of this idea comes with two attendant metaphors: that of information and, perhaps even more perniciously, that of DNA as language, with the code used to interpret DNA symbols into meaningful proteins. The latter metaphor deserves more systematic analysis than is possible here. It is particularly harmful because it disregards the fact that, ultimately, DNA is a molecule interacting with other molecules through a complex set of mechanisms. DNA is not just some text to be interpreted, and to regard it as such is an inaccurate simplification.
The theoretical schemes for the genetic code are particularly important because the success of any of them would have provided at least a rudimentary theory of information for molecular biology. However, despite their failure, the ideas of coding and information in molecular biology persisted. The reason for this is the unusual simplicity of prokaryotic genomes. Much of molecular biology, especially in the 1960s, was established through the study of only a single species, Escherichia coli, whose genome was particularly well behaved. Every DNA segment has either a coding or a regulatory function. For coding regions, transcription results in a complementary mRNA molecule that, with no further modification, is translated at the ribosome. If, following Crick, the specificity of a DNA sequence is identified with the information encoded in it, then the three precepts stated at the beginning of this article become plausible.
However, Crick's definition of information remains quirky: for instance, longer segments of DNA, unless they encode more genes, cannot be said to carry more information than shorter ones. Regulatory sequences do not have any coding role: they cannot be said to contain information in any straightforward sense. Worse, because the code is so arbitrary (i.e., there are no theories that explain why a particular codon codes for its amino acid residue), the concept of information cannot be invoked in any explanatory role: there is no potential for explaining novel biological phenomena by appeals to some property of information. Nevertheless, these problems become insignificant once attention shifts to eukaryotic genetics.
The unexpected complexity of eukaryotic genetics Monod (1971 1987 for a  review) . At present, the most extensive variations have been found in mitochondrial DNA, in which, for instance, across all the major kingdoms UGA codes for tryptophan rather than causing translation to terminate as it does in the usual code. It can be argued that mitochondrial DNA is "special" because mitochondria probably arose as independent organisms that were subsequently incorporated into eukaryotic cells. However, in the nuclear DNA of at least four species of protozoa, UAA and UAG can code for glutamine rather than terminating translation. Moreover, in many species, UGA codes for amino acid residues that ,do not belong to the standard set of 20. In some viral DNA sequences UGA and UAG are sometimes, but not always, read through, that is, ignored both as termination signals and as codons (Fox 1987 ). Even in the same RNA sequence, these codons sometimes result in termination and are sometimes ignored. For example, the virus Q/l has a coat protein that is usually produced by having UGA read as a termination codon. However, 2 % of the time it is ignored, resulting in a longer functional protein (Fox 1987 ). * The discovery of frameshift mutations has destroyed any residual belief in a natural synchronization of the genetic code. The extent to which frame shifts are present in organisms is largely a matter of conjecture (Atkins et al. 1991). Sometimes, frame shifts at the DNA level are used to transcribe an RNA segment that is translated into a different protein than the standard one (Fox 1987 in the mRNA for apolipoprotein becomes deaminated, converting it to a U and creating a stop codon. Deamination of C to U, and the reverse process (U --C amination), occur in several plant mitochondrial mRNA transcripts as well. Moreover, even more unusual behaviors have been observed with mitochondrial RNAs in which bases can be deleted or inserted. The latter, especially, leads to a situation that can be interpreted as the formation of proteins for which there are no genes. In an extreme case, in the human parasite Trypanosoma brucei, as many as 551 U's are inserted throughout the transcript coding for NADH dehydrogenase subunit 7, and 88 are deleted (Koslowski et al. 1990 ). In this case, the DNA segment encoding the primary transcript can hardly be considered a gene for NADH dehydrogenase subunit 7. By looking at the DNA sequence it would be impossible to predict beforehand that this was the protein that would eventually be produced. Moreover, in almost all eukaryotes bases are added as "tails" and "caps" to the RNA after transcription.
In the present context, RNA editing is the most interesting facet of eukaryotic genetics: it already shows how the first precept described at the outset of this article (that all information resides in the DNA sequences of the genome) cannot be universally true. Acceptance of the idea that not all information resides in DNA sequences implies the acceptance of the idea that not all information proceeds as a transfer from DNA to RNA to protein, at least through the conventional coding relationship. Then the Central Dogma becomes dubious.
It would be unreasonable to criticize molecular biologists for not predicting these complexities in the 1960s, long before there was any experimental evidence for them. Nevertheless, these complexities show that the information/coding picture inherited from E. coli should no longer be regarded as the conceptual core of molecular biology. In particular, one should wonder whether the idea of a genetic code captures something important about biological systems or whether it is simply a metaphor that has epiphenomenally emerged from the accident that both nucleic acids and proteins happen physically to be linear molecules.
Cybernetics and information theory
The argument that has been developed so far assumes that "information" should be basically understood as Crick (1958) construed it, that is, what is specified by a DNA sequence through the genetic code. The problems with that interpretation nevertheless leave open the possibility that there is some other interpretation of that term that will allow its recovery as an interesting theoretical concept of molecular biology. Historically, there have been two such interpretations, and these have to be disposed of to complete the argument of this article.
The first of these was already alluded to by Ephrussi et al.'s (1953) comment that understanding information transfer may involve exploring "cybernetics at the bacterial level." Cybernetics, from their and other similar points of view, would provide the theory for the use of information in molecular biology. However, nobody seems to be certain about what constitutes cybernetics (see Pierce 1962 ). The term "cybernetics" was popularized with messianic fervor by Norbert Wiener (1948). However, all that is clear from Wiener's work is that cybernetics is a theory of regulated and, especially, self-regulating systems. Regulation was posited to occur through "feedback," a concept that had entered biology long before the invention of cybernetics, but had been co-opted into the cybernetic framework (Keller 1995 , Sarkar 1996 . Feedback provides the information for regulation. In cybernetics, the concept of information gets no more explicit than the indication that "information" is that which enables regulation.
The value of cybernetics in molecular biology is doubtful, although putative cybernetic interpretations of genetics began as early as 1950 (see Kalmus 1950) . If the published record is taken as evidence, these interpretations had negligible impact during the 1950s and early 1960s, when the conceptual framework of molecular biology came to be established. They were given a new lease of life by Monod (1971) in Chance and Necessity, when he reinterpreted much of his earlier work, including the model of allosteric regulation of proteins and the operon model of bacterial cell regulation, as examples of cybernetic systems (Sarkar 1996) .
Whatever plausibility this interpretation may have had in 1971, it falls apart, once again because of the unexpected complexity of the eukaryotic genome. Eukaryotic gene regulation is not well understood even today, but it is clear that no model similar to the operon can account for the regulation of eukaryotic genes (see Sarkar 1996 for detail). Cybernetics appears to have been little more than a diversion in the development of molecular biology, but even if it is somehow reinstated (although it is hard to see how), its associated concept of information (that which enables regulation) cannot enable a recovery of the three precepts mentioned at the beginning of this article: "information" as "feedback" is hardly what resides in DNA, passes from DNA to RNA to protein, or, for that matter, can make the Central Dogma true.
A second alternative interpretation of information emerged from the mathematical theory of communication, which eventually came to be called information theory (Shannon 1948) . In information theory, the amount of information is measured by the logarithm of the relative number of choices available during a communication process. Information connotes uncertainty; formally, its numerical value is determined by an entropy function that is similar to the usual entropy of statistical mechanics. In the 1950s, there were many attempts to apply this notion of information to molecular biology. Branson (1953) Information theory is very strong on the negative side, i.e. in demonstrating what cannot be done; on the positive side its application to the study of living things has not produced many results so far; it has not led to the discovery of new facts, nor has its application to known facts been tested in critical experiments. To date, a definitive judgment of the value of information theory in biology is not possible.
Sporadic attempts to apply information theory directly to molecular biology continue, but the results are less than exciting. For instance, a major result of Yockey's (1992) attempt to apply information theory to molecular biology is that polypeptides may not code for DNA sequences (which is Yockey's version of the Central Dogma). The basis for this "theorem" is the degeneracy of the genetic code: a given polypeptide sequence can be encoded by different DNA sequences. The conclusion is correct. What is mysterious is why information theory-or any abstract theoretical framework-has to be invoked to make so trivial a point. It is a trivial combinatorial fact that was known by Gamow, Crick, or anyone else who had ever thought about the relation between DNA and protein.
Recently, Thomas Schneider and his collaborators (starting with Schneider et al. 1986 ) have made promising use of information theory to find the most functionally relevant parts of long DNA sequences when these are all that are available. The basic idea, which goes back to Kimura (1961) , is that functional portions of sequences are most likely to be conserved through natural selection. These will therefore have low information content (in Shannon's sense). Whether Schneider's methods will live up to their initial promise remains to be seen. Nevertheless, for conceptual reasons alone, this notion of "information" (i.e., Shannon information) is irrelevant in the present context. According to this notion, for DNA sequences the "information" content is a property of a set of sequences: the more varied a set, the greater the "informa- 
Conclusions
Thus, neither cybernetics nor formal information theory can rescue the concept of information for molecular biology in such a way as to permit the recovery of the conventional picture of DNA sequences encoding information to be decoded using the genetic code. The natural conclusion is that the conventional picture should be abandoned. However, because the concepts of information and coding have been central to how molecular biology is currently understood, abandoning these concepts will have important consequences. There are at least five such consequences, and a little reflection shows that they are, in fact, desirable: There is certainly something peculiar, and extremely interesting, about how DNA resists easy change across the phyla. But this observation is something to be studied and understood, not something to be explained away on the basis of some alleged law about some incoherent notion of information. * Many influential contemporary discussions of the origin of life have concentrated on the origin of information, in which information is construed simply to be nucleic acid sequences (e.g., Eigen 1992). Implicit in these discussions is the assumption that nucleic acid sequences ultimately encode all that is necessary for the genesis of living forms and, therefore, that a solution to the problem of the initial generation of these sequences will solve the problem of the origin of life. The move away from sequences would put these efforts in proper perspective: to explain the possible origin of persistent segments of DNA does not suffice as an explanation of the origin of living cells. * The emphasis on DNA sequences that marks contemporary molecular biology is misplaced. Therefore, the sorts of arguments that were mustered to initiate the Human Genome Project (HGP-a crash program to sequence DNA blindly, that is, without first determining the functional roles of the segments to be sequenced) are less than compelling. This is not a new point. It has previously been made, on the basis of other considerations, by many critics of the HGP (Davis 1992, Lederberg 1993 , Lewontin 1992 , Sarkar 1992 ). These arguments, taken together, strongly suggest that the HGP should be limited to the mapping of all known genetic loci to specific positions on chromosomes and the sequencing of only those segments that are found to have some functional interest. There is little scientific rationale for the blind sequencing of DNA, and the shift of scarce resources to it is unjustified. Human and other genome sequences will ultimately be sequenced, with or without the HGP, but should such sequencing proceed at a normal pace, not only would such a shift of resources not occur but there would be more time to prepare for the well-known social and ethical problems that the HGP raises (see, for example, Holtzman 1989). * Abandoning the coding metaphor will also do much to liberate biology from the unfortunate linguistic metaphor of an organism's (or a cell's) DNA sequence being a message in some language to be decoded. Despite the immense popularity of this metaphor (see, for example, Wills 1991 and Pollack 1994), at the technical level the linguistic metaphor is at best only as helpful in understanding biology as the concept of coding. The complexities of eukaryotic genetics show that the code is of only limited use in the transition from DNA to an organism's biology. Given a DNA sequence, simply to read off an amino acid sequence requires that it be known whether any nonstandard coding is being used, what reading frame is to be used, that all gene-non-gene and intron-exon boundaries are known, and what kinds of RNA editing will take place. Even at the metaphorical level, it is unlikely that these complexities can all be treated as questions of language: after all, natural languages do not contain large segments of meaningless signs interspersed with occasional bits of meaningful symbols. Of course, even with an amino acid sequence, biology has barely begun: one then faces the problem of going to higher levels of organization, and in the absence of a solution to the protein folding problem there is little prospect for doing that if one really starts from a DNA "text." In any case, the sterility of the informational picture of molecular biology is a much-needed reminder that DNA is, ultimately, a molecule and not a language.
